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Abstract 
 
 
On the 13th July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill,1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law 
implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment 
discrimination rights.3  
The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same 
interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over 
the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify 
the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally 
giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their 
preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective 
justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts 
have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no 
apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula whilst labelling it as being 
no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament 
to assume all is well with the this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell 
them so.  
Using a handful of cases, this paper exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and 
suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the Bill (which no doubt 
is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both 
pre- and post-Brexit. 
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Introduction 
 
EU lawyers in general, and discrimination lawyers in particular, will be familiar with the ‘Bilka 
test’ of objective justification,
4
 which is the expression of the Court of Justice’s general 
principle of proportionality
5
 in the context of (employment) discrimination law. Many will 
know also that this represents the ‘business necessity defense’ devised by the United States’ 
Supreme Court, which developed the notion of indirect discrimination (‘disparate impact’), 
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beginning with Griggs v Duke Power.6 It is unfortunate (for many) that for decades British 
courts have been proffering a diluted version of the defence while asserting this is consistent 
with Bilka and its progenies. This article explores these cases, their decisions, reasoning, and 
language, to expose these shortcomings as inconstant with EU law, as well as principle and 
policy. It concludes that the only realistic solution is a forthright legislative restatement of the 
test, and post-Brexit, the introduction of a statutory rule of interpretation mandating a liberal 
and purposive interpretation of all equality law, which will align more closely British and EU 
interpretations and applications of this law, whilst remaining beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
 
The concept of indirect discrimination 
 
Statistics reveal a racially unbalanced workforce, or gender pay gap; yet there is no evidence 
of any facially discriminatory cause. What to do? The concept of indirect discrimination was 
developed to address such scenarios. If claimants can lay a cause at the employer’s door, say, 
word of mouth hiring, an entrance exam favouring whites, or a pay regime favouring 
predominantly male occupations, then a prima facie case of discrimination can be established. 
This is so where the employer had no discriminatory intent and there were many causes beyond 
the employer’s control. For instance, an employer may not be responsible for the inferior  
education of minorities, who are now disfavoured by its (unnecessary) entrance exam,7 nor for 
women choosing lower paid (but equally skilled) occupations according to cultural norms.8 
Nonetheless, the law provides the victims with a cause of action against the employer. 
But the employer has a defence. If it can show that the cause is an employment practice 
appropriate and necessary to achieve a legitimate employment goal, then there is no liability. 
This is key. Without the defence, employers would be obliged to hire by quota, politically and 
economically unthinkable in any western economy. But the precise application of the defence 
is key to resolving any unnecessary pay gaps and other workplace imbalances. Thus, the focus 
of this law is on discriminatory effects and responsibility, rather than cultural norms and 
culpability. A consequence of this is that there should be no margins or leeway to the defence. 
Such margins are margins for the identified discriminatory effects to perpetuate. Not only is 
this contrary to principle and policy, it is economically inefficient.9 
 This notion of necessity was inherent in the development of the law of indirect 
discrimination, which began in the United States Supreme Court. In Griggs v Duke Power, the 
US Supreme Court ruled, ‘The [Civil Rights] Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business 
necessity.’10 In other words, once the claimant has made out a prima facie case (that the 
employer’s practice adversely affects a protected group) the burden shifts to the employer to 
show that ‘the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.’11  
 One consequence of this ‘necessity’ aspect is that a claimant may prevail if there exists 
a less discriminatory alternative means to achieve the same legitimate goal. Even small 
adjustments to the means can make a significant difference. One such practice is ‘banding’. 
This can be useful for entrance and promotion exams, and is used in the United States (an 
example is provided below). Here, strict ranking scores can be placed into bands, and selection 
then made from these bands, where that would reduce the discriminatory impact. At first sight, 
this might seem to offend the symmetrical principle of direct discrimination law, by 
deliberately disfavouring the advantaged, but protected group, say men, or whites. As such, 
this would not be a less discriminatory alternative.12 But this need not be so, as explained in 
the American case law: 
 Banding is premised on the belief that minor differences in test scores do not reliably 
predict differences in job performance. It also recognizes that an individual is unlikely 
to achieve an identical score on consecutive administrations of the same examination. 
Because some measurement error is inevitable, strict rank order promotions will not 
necessarily reflect the correct comparative abilities of the candidates. The smaller the 
difference between observed scores, the more likely it is a result of measurement error, 
and not a variance in job-related skills and abilities.13 
 
Similarly, the jurist and judge Posner J rejected an argument that banding amounted to unlawful 
discrimination with the assertion that, ‘In fact it’s a universal and normally an unquestioned 
method of simplifying scoring by eliminating meaningless gradations.’14 Banding has become 
well enough known in the US jurisprudence, that a defendant refusing to adopt it where 
appropriate would be liable. 
More generally though, how would a court, or claimants, evaluate the employer’s 
testimony that it had considered (and evaluated) all alternatives, when the requisite knowledge, 
expertise, and resources, are likely to be in the hands of the employer? An employer could omit 
a less discriminatory, but ‘inconvenient’, alternative without the claimant or the court 
becoming any wiser. Some class actions, and/or union-funded actions may well have the 
resources to evaluate the employer’s assertions and practices. But that is an element of fortune, 
not law. The US Supreme Court has offered a partial solution, which again finds a place on the 
procedural landscape of shifting burdens. The requirement for business necessity is augmented 
with the Alternative Practice doctrine. Here, should a prima facie case be met with an 
apparently good business necessity defence, the plaintiff may still prevail by proposing an 
alternative business practice with a less discriminatory effect.
15
 The rubric generally used was 
set in Albermarle Paper Co v Moody
16
 where the Court stated that the alternative should ‘also 
serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’
17
 Again, 
without the expertise or funding, a claimant may find this too difficult a burden to discharge,18 
but it increases the chances of an employer having to adopt a less discriminatory alternative, 
and once some alternatives (such as banding) are discussed in litigation, they will become 
common knowledge, enabling better-informed courts to evaluate the employer’s defence.  
An example of a successful demonstration of an alternative practice (of banding) arose 
in Bridgeport Guardians v City of Bridgeport
19
 where tests used in the promotion of police 
officers to the rank of sergeant were challenged. One hundred and seventy persons applied for 
nineteen posts and the results showed that the tests had a disparate impact on blacks and 
Hispanics, with only 30 per cent and 46 per cent respectively passing in comparison with 68 
per cent of whites. But the real impact was worse than that because the nineteen best performers 
were selected, leaving no minorities with promotion. The employer successfully justified the 
tests as a reliable and accurate predictor of job performance. However, what these figures did 
not reveal was that, of all those passing, the marks were extremely close. The plaintiffs put 
forward evidence that the difference between a few marks was insignificant. Accordingly the 
plaintiffs suggested that the marks should be banded: that is, marks within, say, eight per cent 
of each other, placed in a single band. Then the successful candidates could be selected from 
those bands, using other (non-discriminatory) factors for selection. In this way the best 
performers were selected without a disparate impact. The Court found that the use of banding 
would alleviate the disparate racial effect of the examination without imposing any significant 
burden on the defendants whilst serving their legitimate interests.
20
 
This Alternative Practice doctrine has not been adopted by the EU or British schemes. 
This places an even stronger emphasis on a strict scrutiny of the employer’s defence. Thus, if 
the anti-discrimination legislation is to address properly the gender pay gap and other 
discriminatory patterns, the judiciary must demand the least discriminatory alternative.  
 
 
The legislation 
 
The discrimination Directives nowadays state that a defendant may ‘objectively justify’ a 
challenged practice by showing a legitimate aim, and that the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.21 This formula codifies Court of Justice case law, originally 
formulated in Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz, which held that a challenged practice is 
justified if, 
 
the means chosen ... correspond to a genuine need on the part of the undertaking, are 
appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and are necessary to that 
end...22 
 
It would seem that for an aim to be legitimate, it must ‘correspond to a genuine [or “real”23] 
need of the undertaking’. The test was been transposed into the British legislation, nowadays 
the Equality Act 2010, as ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’.24 Although 
the expression ‘proportionate’ compresses the Bilka elements of ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’, 
the formula was intended to implement the EU formula.25 
 The British judicial dilution of this defence has stemmed from two of its features. First, 
and almost universally, the domestic courts perpetuated a notion that ‘necessary’, means 
‘reasonably necessary’, which provides some leeway to discriminate. Second, on occasions, 
there has been some confusion between aims and means, which again, has provided some 
leeway. Allied to both of these issues is a balancing test, which, rather perversely provides a 
similar leeway while having the potential to vitiate even legitimate aims. 
 
 
Necessary and reasonably necessary 
 
At first sight, the addition of ‘reasonable’ might be just a way of denoting the test as an 
objective one.26 But that has not how the phrase has been used. Instead, it has been used to 
qualify ‘necessary’ with a notion of reasonableness, and in doing so provided employers with 
some leeway, which is leeway for unnecessary discrimination. 
A short history is required to understand how this has come about. The original British 
discrimination legislation used the rather open-ended phrase, ‘justifiable irrespective of sex [or 
race]’.
27
 In the early years, tribunals (influenced by Griggs), equated this with ‘necessity’; in 
other words, the challenged practice had to be no more than necessary to achieve the aim. For 
example, in Steel v Union of Post Office Workers
28
 the President of the EAT, Phillips J, citing 
Griggs,29 wrote of the defendant’s ‘heavy’ onus of justification, which included showing that 
the challenged practice was ‘genuine’ and ‘necessary’. Among other things, the tribunal should 
weigh the need for the practice against the discriminatory effect, and ‘distinguish between a 
[practice] which is necessary and one which is merely convenient, and for this purpose it is 
relevant to consider whether the employer can find some other and non-discriminatory method 
of achieving his object’.30 
In 1982, however, the Court of Appeal in Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission
31
 
contrasted ‘necessity’ with the statutory word justifiable. Kerr LJ stated that ‘justifiable ... 
clearly applies a lower standard than ... necessary’.
32
 Eveleigh LJ considered it to mean 
‘something...acceptable to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable’.
33
 Following this, 
Balcombe LJ, in Hampson v Department of Education,
34
 conflated the justification process to 
a single ‘balancing’ test, which weighs the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice 
against the reasonable needs of the employer.35 
In the meantime, the Court of Justice was developing a differently formulated 
justification test, expressed in Bilka, which gradually found its way into the domestic 
legislation. As the influence of EU law grew, domestic courts were forced to reconcile the 
Hampson test with this formula. If there were a pivotal point in this process, leading to today’s 
position, it came in the Court of Appeal’s (re)formulation in Barry v Midland Bank.36 After 
citing the Bilka and Hampson tests, Peter Gibson LJ, speaking for the Court, said, 
 
In our judgment it would be wrong to extrapolate from those words written in that 
context that an employer can never justify indirect discrimination in a redundancy 
payment scheme unless the form of the scheme is shown to be necessary as the only 
possible scheme. 
 
Thus, he surmised, the ‘true position’ was that the objective must be legitimate and ‘the means 
used are appropriate to achieve that objective and are reasonably necessary for that end.’37 
Peter Gibson LJ cited in support the House of Lords authority, Rainey v Greater Glasgow 
Health Board.38 In Rainey, Lord Keith in fact had to decide whether the defence was subjective 
or objective (or both).39 Citing the recently decided Bilka, he concluded it must be objective, 
and in this context, labelled Bilka’s requirement accordingly as ‘reasonably necessary’.40 Thus, 
Peter Gibson’s LJ reformulation, giving employers some leeway, had no basis in precedent. 
There is nothing in the Court of Justice language or jurisprudence to support such an 
approach.41 In fact, his judgment reconciled Hampson and a test of reasonable necessity with 
Bilka for no other reason than he said it was so. The rubric has gained traction through nothing 
more than repetition, with even the Supreme Court culpable. In Ministry of Justice v O’Brien42 
for instance, the Supreme Court quoted the familiar EU justification ‘Bilka’ test provided by 
the Court of Justice for the case in hand,43 and in the next summarising paragraph added the 
qualifier ‘reasonably’ for no given reason.44 
It is no surprise then, that the fiction of conformity continued in the Court of Appeal, 
with an unabashed Maurice Kay LJ asserting that this leeway can only be afforded with the 
qualified formula: ‘The test does not require the employer to establish that the measure 
complained of was “necessary” in the sense of being the only course open to him.’45 More 
recently, Slade J in the EAT asserted, ‘neither domestic nor European jurisprudence regard the 
existence of a possible alternative non-discriminatory means of achieving the aim of a measure 
or policy to be determinative against justifying a discriminatory PCP’.46 
This is a looser test than one requiring that the means used discriminate no more than 
necessary, and provides a similar leeway to the Hampson test. There are boundaries of course, 
albeit somewhat more generous to the employer: ‘Reasonably necessary’ did not mean that a 
defendant could justify a measure simply by showing it was one of a band of reasonable 
responses which a reasonable defendant (e.g. an employer) would adopt, as in unfair 
dismissal;47 in one rare instance Sedley LJ suggested that tribunals should consider ‘fairly 
obvious alternatives’.48 But the leeway remained. In contrast to a strict necessity test, 
defendants were not bound to show that the practice was the only possible one available.49 As 
Maurice Kay LJ reminded tribunals in Cadman v Health and Safety Executive, ‘The difference 
between “necessary” and “reasonably necessary” is a significant one...’50 
Indeed, a few examples will illustrate the significance of the distinction between the 
original and modified tests. First, two cases pre-dating the Ojutiku pronouncements. In Steel v 
Union of Post Office Workers,
51
 preferable postal rounds were awarded according to length of 
service as a ‘permanent status’ employee. As women historically had been prevented from 
acquiring permanent status, they were disadvantaged. Phillips J held that the justification would 
include a consideration of whether it was necessary to allot postal walks by seniority and, if so, 
whether the seniority rule could be revised so that women would be given credit for their 
temporary service. In other words, if there existed a less discriminatory alternative, it should 
be adopted. 
In Bohon-Mitchell v Common Professional Examination Board,
52
 the Board maintained 
that persons with a degree in a non-law subject should to take a twelve month course in 
academic law before being able to sit the Bar Finals. But those with a non-British or non-Irish 
degree were required to complete a 21 month course. Save for one year, Ms Bohon-Mitchell 
had been living in England since 1972 and was married to an Englishman. In 1978 she applied 
to take her Bar Finals and as an American graduate, she was required to sit the 21-month course. 
Upon her complaint for indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality or national origin, the 
Board tried to justify that requirement on the ground that barristers needed a wide knowledge 
of the English way of life (the aim), and the simplest way of identifying those without such 
experience was by their degrees (the means). Applying the standards set by Steel, an industrial 
tribunal held that the requirement to sit a 21-month course was not justified because it was not 
necessary to achieve the aim. Instead, each candidate’s familiarity with the English way of life 
could be assessed on a case by case basis.
53
 If the tribunal had applied the Hampson test, or 
asked if the means were reasonably necessary, it may well have concluded that the requirement 
was justified. The evidence was that just eight out of 191 applicants with a non-law degree had 
overseas degrees. Probably fewer than that eight had been resident in Britain and were therefore 
‘familiar with the English way of life’. In any case, in terms of numbers, the discriminatory 
effect was relatively minor. If this discriminatory effect were weighed against the 
inconvenience of changing the system, a court may well find that defendant’s administrative 
needs justified the practice, or was a reasonable way to achieve the aim. In other words 
discrimination would persist because that would be more convenient for the Board. 
 Finally, a more recent Court of Justice decision nicely exposes the difference In 
Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority,
54
 the defendant Health Authority was trying to justify a 
40 per cent difference in pay between speech therapists (98 per cent female) and pharmacists 
(63 per cent female). As women were over-represented in the lower paid group, the Health 
Authority was obliged to justify the difference. It argued that market forces caused the 
difference. But the evidence was that only an extra ten per cent pay was needed to recruit a 
sufficient number of pharmacists. Thus, there existed a less discriminatory alternative of paying 
the pharmacists a ten per cent premium. In the UK, the EAT55 applied the Hampson test and 
weighed the 40 per cent difference in pay against the need for sufficient pharmacists. Given 
that stark choice, the EAT held that the difference in pay was justified. In other words, the 
leeway provided by the less strict Hampson approach meant that employers were not bound to 
use the least discriminatory practice available. The ECJ held that the pay difference could only 
be justified to the proportion that market forces required (ten per cent). The existence of the 
less discriminatory alternative meant that the practice (a 40 per cent pay difference) could not 
be justified. For the ECJ, proportionality meant no more than necessary. 
 
If, as the question referred seems to suggest, the national court has been able to 
determine precisely what proportion of the increase in pay is attributable to market 
forces, it must necessarily accept that the pay differential is objectively justified to the 
extent of that proportion. When national authorities have to apply Community law, they 
must apply the principle of proportionality.56 
 
The cases demonstrate that the application of a strict test enables courts to demand equally 
effective (if inconvenient) alternatives and dictate that there is no more discrimination than 
necessary. 
 
 
Confusing aims and means 
 
The Bilka test distinguishes between aims and means. It seems that once an aim is considered 
‘legitimate’ it is untouchable (save for the balancing test, explained above). This permits 
employers a certain amount of latitude and discretion on how to run their affairs, although of 
course, there are limits. As seen above, the aim should correspond to a genuine need.57 Once 
this legitimacy is established, the analysis turns to the means of achieving the aim, and this is 
where most cases on justification are decided. As Enderby in particular demonstrated, the 
means must be suitable and the least discriminatory method of achieving the aim. Here, 
employers have a lot less latitude, and arguably, none at all. Thus, it is vital to distinguish the 
aim(s) and means in any one case. 
 The latitude afforded with the aim has enabled appeal courts to reject claims on the 
basis that a tribunal cannot substitute its own (less discriminatory) aim for that of the employer. 
This is apparent from three important cases on this matter. First, in Barry v Midland Bank,58 a 
severance payment based on two criteria - the salary at the time of termination and length of 
service - was challenged for adversely affecting women, who were more likely to have moved 
to part-time status and whose salary-related payment was therefore lower, despite having 
worked full-time for a period in the past. Ms Barry herself had worked full-time for eleven 
years, moving to part-time for a further two years following the birth of her child. Her (equal 
pay) claim of indirect sex discrimination failed at every stage of the appeal process. The House 
of Lords dismissed her appeal on the basis (4-1) that the scheme did not discriminate and so 
did not warrant justification. Only Lord Nicholls decided that the practice required justification. 
The aims of the scheme were to compensate for the loss of job and recognise loyalty, which 
tallied respectively with the two criteria (the means). The claimant’s suggestion that the bank 
could have calculated the payment according to hours worked was rejected. Lord Nicholls 
reasoned,  
 
To decide otherwise would be to compel the bank to abandon its scheme and substitute 
a scheme where severance pay is treated and calculated, not as compensation for loss 
of a job, but as additional pay for past work. That could not be right.59 
 
This dicta has been taken as a principle to reverse some first instance decisions for substituting 
the employer’s aim for another of the tribunal’s choosing. In Land Registry v Benson,60 the 
employer, a self-financing government body, decided to merge two offices and reduce staff 
following a considerable operational loss (nearly £80m). It devised a scheme offering voluntary 
early retirement to employees aged over 50, and (less generous) redundancy to those under 50. 
It allocated a £12m budget for the scheme. More volunteered than the budget could afford, and 
so the employer selected only from those under 50 for redundancy, as that was cheaper. Those 
aged over 50 claimed for indirect age discrimination, in that they were denied the opportunity 
to benefit from the scheme, in comparison to the younger workers (the claimants were later 
dubbed the ‘unfairly non-dismissed’61). The employment tribunal found that reducing staff 
costs was a legitimate aim, but that the employer not shown that it was necessary to limit its 
spending on the scheme to £12m: it had the resources to accept all the applications. The EAT 
(Underhill J) reversed, holding that fixing the budget to £12m was a legitimate aim: ‘Like any 
business, it was entitled to make decisions about the allocation of its resources’.62 In effect, the 
tribunal had substituted the employer’s scheme for one of its own.63 
 The most recent instance, Harrod v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police,64 reached 
the Court of Appeal (Elias, Underhill, and Bean LJJ). Following the 2010 general election, 
police forces were required to make budget cuts of 20 per cent over four years. Five police 
forces opted to retire all officers eligible for compulsory retirement under regulation A19 of 
the Police Pensions Regulations 1987.65 This provided that a police force may, ‘in the general 
interests of efficiency’, require the compulsory retirement of an officer who would be entitled 
to receive a pension of at least two-thirds of his average pensionable pay. Such a pension 
entitlement could be acquired only with at least 30 years of service. This meant only those aged 
48 or more could be retired. Although a ‘substantial majority’ of officers retire voluntarily after 
30 years,66 regulation A19 was applied to all eligible officers, forcing some into compulsory 
retirement. This blanket application of regulation A19 made more savings than was required. 
Officers aged 48 and over brought a claim of indirect age discrimination. It was agreed 
that the dismissals adversely affected those aged 48 and over, and so the case turned on the 
element of justification. An employment tribunal found the dismissals were not justified, as the 
forces could have made the required savings by a less discriminatory means, such as identifying 
those willing to take voluntary retirement, career breaks, part-time working. The EAT reversed, 
with Langstaff J holding that these ‘entirely speculative’ alternatives could not provide the 
required certainty, as officers could change their minds about any of those three options.67 The 
Court of Appeal upheld the EAT reversal, holding that it was not for the tribunal to substitute 
an alternative scheme. 
So far, so clear. It seems straightforward: once an aim is identified as ‘legitimate’ it 
becomes unassailable. But a common difficulty in coming to these decisions was distinguishing 
between aims and means. As Underhill J confessed in Benson: ‘The truth is that the distinction 
between means and aim is not always easy to draw.’68 But this did not seem to matter for the 
judges in these cases. Elias J once noted that that the distinction was ‘a matter of semantics’.69 
Underhill J has observed more than once that, ‘... the dichotomy of “aim” and “means” is not 
always clear cut and the two elements can sometimes reasonably be formulated in more than 
one way’.70 Thus, he advised with a flourish, ‘Tribunals need not cudgel their brains with 
metaphysical inquiries about what count as aims and what count as means as long as the 
underlying balancing exercise is carried out’.71 
 Rather than provide a solution to tribunals (and other interested parties), this presents a 
problem. If it matters little, or is impossible to classify, which features of a defence are aims 
and which are means, how is a tribunal supposed analyse them, when according to Bilka, the 
aims must be legitimate but the means proportionate (or appropriate and necessary)? In Benson 
and Harrod, all the forums pondered at length over which was which. It is inevitable that this 
will lead to confusion. In Harrod, for instance, Langstaff J, considered the aim to be ‘at least 
that of achieving efficiency...’72 In the Court of Appeal, Elias LJ appeared to agree, declaring: 
‘The dismissals are on grounds of efficiency’.73 Meanwhile, Underhill LJ stated, ‘In my view 
the right way to characterise the forces’ aim is that they wished to achieve the maximum 
practicable reduction in the numbers of their officers.’74 Bean LJ was less specific. His leading 
judgment did not expressly identify an aim. The closest he came was when he said, 
 
The decision to reduce officer headcount to the fullest extent available was taken in the 
interests of achieving certainty of costs reduction and it was not for the Tribunal to 
devise an alternative scheme involving the loss of fewer posts.75 
 
Given that it was held a mistake for the tribunal to devise another scheme (as it is not for the 
tribunal to substitute the defendant’s aim for its own), it is implicit here that Bean LJ considered 
the aims to be the ‘fullest’ possible reduction in officer headcount in the interests of achieving 
‘certainty of costs reduction’. 
Not only is this speculation producing a variety of views confusing for interested 
parties, it can incorporate mistakes. For instance, Underhill and Bean LJJ both assumed that it 
was an aim to achieve to maximum possible reduction of staff. This was not the case. The 
forces were under instruction to make a 20 per cent saving. There was no edict to achieve this 
with staff cuts, and certainly not to reduce the staff beyond that necessary to achieve the saving. 
Quite the opposite, one would imagine. Hence, a reduction of officers was just one of many 
cutbacks, including spending on buildings, IT equipment and vehicles; this was in addition to 
the dismissal of some civilian staff. Clearly, the ‘aim’ was to save money, and arguably to do 
so with certainty. Yet, the evidence was that more than the necessary numbers of officers were 
dismissed. By characterising the ‘maximum reduction’ as an ‘aim’, Underhill and Bean LJJ 
detached this action from the required question of proportionality. With some clarity around 
the means and aims, the Court of Appeal may have realised that it was necessary to select only 
the number of ‘A 19’ officers needed to meet the required savings and certainty. The two-thirds 
pension entitlement laid down in regulation A19 was a threshold, not an absolute rule. Thus, 
depending on the calculations, the forces could have selected all those with say, at least three-
quarters pension entitlement. 
Meanwhile, in Benson, after considering the features of the need to break even (at least), 
including the office merger scheme, staffing costs reduction, £12m budget, and method of 
selection, Underhill J said, ‘The uncertainty about how to characterise them ... does not, 
fortunately, matter since in our view all the various potential elements are plainly legitimate.’76 
The error here, albeit of the same flavour, was slightly different. Instead of wrongly classifying 
the features of the case, Underhill LJ measured them all by the standard required for aims, 
again detaching them from the question of proportionality. 
The irony here is of course, after criticising the tribunal below for devising an 
alternative aim, these judges fare only a little better in speculating themselves as what were the 
aims. Thus, as well as being more diligent in identifying the aims and means, further clarity 
would be achieved by expecting defendants to identify their own aims. The indeterminable 
speculation on the defendant’s aim(s) has not only led to confusion and errors, it is wrong in 
principle. The tribunals’ task is to scrutinise the defence provided, not to help draft a party’s 
pleadings. 
 
 
The continued use of the balancing test 
 
Assiduous readers of the law reports (concerning discrimination) would have noticed judges 
occasionally reverting to the Hampson ‘balancing’ test rather than, or alongside, the 
‘reasonably necessary’ rubric. It seems they consider these expressions to mean one of the same 
thing.77 It is arguable, that the Hampson formula perhaps betrays another departure from Bilka, 
because it requires only that the employer’s needs are ‘reasonable’, and not ‘real’ or ‘genuine’. 
This is hard to sustain though, as ‘fake’, spurious or ‘non-real’ needs are hardly likely to be 
accepted as ‘reasonable’, no matter what the discretion. But the unnecessary exchange of ‘real’ 
for ‘reasonable’ can only add to the confusion by the British judiciary’s rewriting of Bilka. 
In relation to Bilka’s requirement regarding the means, the language used in either 
(domestic) test shares the same feature of discretion, or ‘leeway’. As such, it should make little 
difference which test is used, save in one way. The Hampson test permits tribunals to vitiate 
the employer’s aim by another route. Where the aim is legitimate, but the only means to achieve 
the aim ‘outweighs’ it because of its overwhelming discriminatory effect, then the aim itself is 
vitiated. 
In Allen v GMB,78 when negotiating with their employer, the claimants’ trade union 
prioritised pay protection and future pay for all its members over compensation (back pay) for 
unequal pay in the past, affecting just the female members, who were the claimants. The reason 
was that the union did not wish to antagonise the employer in its aim to achieve the best possible 
deal overall. In pursuit of their goal, the union persuaded the claimants to agree to the 
negotiated deal. In doing so, the union wrongly told the claimants that no better deal could have 
been achieved for them by litigation. The claimants sued their union for indirect 
discrimination.79 Reversing the employment tribunal’s decision for the claimants, the EAT 
(Elias J) found that although the union’s priorities were legitimate aims,80 the means used, 
albeit dishonest, were the only way to achieve the goal. Hence, there was no less discriminatory 
alternative. To hold otherwise would be substituting the union’s aims for its own,81 violating a 
seemingly cardinal rule.82 The Court of Appeal restored the tribunal’s decision holding that if 
the means are disproportionate, then they cannot be justified. Maurice Kay LJ said ‘..although 
the objective was a legitimate one, it was not the only possible legitimate one. If it were 
achievable only by disproportionate means, then it would not be susceptible to justification. To 
conclude otherwise would be to license disproportionality.’83 The Court of Appeal came to this 
decision without citing Hampson or the balancing test. But in effect, that is what it used. Elias’s 
J decision was perfectly logical on the wording of Bilka, but clearly unpalatable for the Court 
of Appeal. Of course, the decision could readily be explained as one hostile to trade unions, 
and Elias’s J holding may have stuck otherwise. Nonetheless, it does show the utility of a 
balancing test and distinguishing it from any notion of necessity, which is confined to the 
means.  
It is inconceivable that in such a situation, where a relatively modest aim inevitably 
creates a considerable adverse impact, that the Court of Justice would adhere to the semantics 
of the Bilka test in preference to its more general principle of proportionality. The nearest case 
to this scenario arose Rinke.84 Here, the requirement for some full-time work by two Council 
Directives85 on the training of doctors, was claimed to offend the EU’s general principle of 
(sex) equality. The Court weighed the policy (harmonising training across the EU, thus 
facilitating free movement of doctors, as well as better preparation to fulfil the particular 
function) against the discriminatory impact. Although it concluded that the Directives were 
justified, it showed a willingness of the Court to take this approach.86 
This shows that the balancing test is distinguishable from the ‘reasonably necessary’ 
approach, in that it has some utility in addressing the gender pay gap and other discriminatory 
patterns. Hence the suggestion made back in 1978 by Phillips J,
87
 and more recently by the 
Supreme Court88 that the courts should use both tests would seem to be the most effective way 
to satisfy the policy of addressing all discrimination. 
Such a dual approach ought to have jarred Lord Nicholls’s reasoning in Barry v 
Midland Bank,89 especially when scrutinising a scheme under a ‘fundamental’ rule of EU law, 
such as sex discrimination.90 When invoking the ‘substitution’ rule, Lord Nicholls speculated 
that the claimant’s suggested alternative (of severance payments calculated by hours worked) 
would be more discriminatory, as women were more likely to have worked fewer hours over 
the same time period.91 Yet, although Lord Nicholls recited a balancing test, in deference to 
the substitution rule he failed to apply it. Had he done so, he may have considered that the 
discriminatory impact of the Bank’s scheme outweighed its aims (of compensation for loss of 
job and rewarding loyalty). As such, he may have asked the (well-resourced multi-national) 
bank to calculate and compare the adverse impact of alternative aims, such as paring down to 
original aim to a reward of loyalty calculated on the length of service.  
 
 
A UK referral to the Court of Justice? 
 The only referral close to the matter came back in 1999, which provided a similar narrative of 
a domestic court diluting the EU guidance. The case was distinguishable as it concerned a 
social policy justification where the Court of Justice can provide defendants with some leeway. 
A social policy justification is used normally by Governments defending a domestic measure 
against superior EU discrimination law. Where a defence is based on social policy, the Bilka 
test is modified. Defendants must still show that the practice reflects a necessary aim of its 
social policy and is suitable and necessary for achieving that aim, but at the same time, they 
are afforded a broad margin of discretion in choosing the appropriate means to achieve that 
policy. In R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p Seymour-Smith,92 the extension of the 
qualification period for Unfair Dismissal rights from one to two years was challenged as 
indirectly discriminating against women, who are more transient in the workforce.
93
 Upon 
referral from the House of Lords, the Court of Justice recited the Bilka test and the margin of 
discretion, but added, with an allusion to the defence proffered by the Government, the margin 
of discretion is not so broad to have the effect of frustrating the implementation of the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment: ‘Mere generalisations ... ae not enough’.94 
The Government’s argument was that the legislation would encourage recruitment, 
although it offered no evidence that, after six years, it had made any impact. Upon return, the 
House of Lords held that the Government had justified the legislation. Lord Nicholls cited the 
Court of Justice ruling on the margin of discretion, but omitted its reference to Bilka, necessity, 
and the counsel against ‘mere generalisations’. This selective interpretation was enough for 
Lord Nicholls to conclude that the burden on the Government was not ‘as heavy as previously 
thought.’95 Read as a whole the ECJ’s judgment clearly envisaged that the measure must be 
‘necessary’ to achieve an aim.96 Even on Lord Nicholls’s less stringent test, the decision was 
surprising. After all, the Government offered no evidence to support its assertion of increasing 
employment. The decision might be explained by the marginal adverse effect of the legislation 
(about eight per cent less women than men qualified for unfair dismissal rights). But on a 
national scale, it meant that for no good reason, for some fourteen years, hundreds of thousands 
of British women worked without the protection of Unfair Dismissal rights. Of course, the 
ultimate beneficiary in this case was not the defendant (the UK Government), as there was no 
evidence of improved employment nationally, but Britain’s employers, who were given more 
leeway to dismiss more conveniently and cheaply, a process already proven to adversely affect 
women. 
 Although this was not a singular employment case where an unabated Bilka test should 
apply, the signal sent out by Lord Nicholls’s judgment chimed with the diluted approach 
already growing in the British courts.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As well as preserving the fiction of compliance, this language of compromise puts an 
unnecessary judicial gloss on the statutory words and Court of Justice jurisprudence. 
‘Proportionate’ and ‘necessary’ do not mean nearly proportionate, or reasonably necessary. A 
strict approach does not mean that businesses would be forced to spend great sums for a 
marginal reduction in a discriminatory impact: economic reasons are acceptable as a legitimate 
aims.97 These cases demonstrate that the British judiciary’s interpretation of the notion of 
objective justification falls short of principle, policy, and the overriding EU jurisprudence. 
They also show an unexplained makeshift (and not very adept) sleight of language employed 
to disguise this. 
 The American ‘banding’ and Alternative Practice cases, in addition to Enderby, 
demonstrate that even marginal or subtle adjustments can make a significant impact in reducing 
discrimination, without damaging the employer’s business. The British approach at best rules 
out all bar ‘fairly obvious alternatives’.98 At its worst it happily speculates over the employer’s 
aims to find a justification, and steadfastly refuses to interfere with them should that produce a 
less discriminatory alternative. The only adventurous decision here was to give the otherwise 
permissive Hampson balancing test its full potential against a trade union,99 raising suspicions 
that employer’s costs or inconvenience are weighing heavily in the court’s thinking, if not their 
expressions. 
 Despite dicta to the contrary,100 it is arguable that cases such as Benson, Barry,101 
Harrod and Enderby (in the EAT), as well as Seymour-Smith, were in fact decided on a notion 
of reasonableness rather than proportionality. If allowed to carry on this way post-Brexit, there 
is a danger of the courts drifting past the already-loose boundaries expressed and assuming the 
‘band of reasonable responses’ test from unfair dismissal, in line with the common law tradition 
of Wednesbury reasonableness,102 rather than the civil law practice of proportionality.  
Within the remaining time that the UK maintains EU membership, there is a remote 
possibility of a reference to Luxembourg, where the Court of Justice could restate in forthright 
terms the formula directed at these shortfalls. As Seymour-Smith demonstrated, even forthright 
terms may not be enough. Further, this possibility depends upon the fortune of a suitable case 
arriving in the courts, and the wilfully blinkered judiciary making a referral. In any case, 
assuming the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, when enacted, ousts the Luxembourg 
jurisdiction, this cannot occur post-Brexit. 
Given that one cannot rely on reference to the Luxembourg Court even pre-Brexit, one 
solution would seem to be a codicil to the Bill that its interpretation should continue post-Brexit 
to follow that provided by the Court of Justice. But that would be relying on the chance that 
the matter comes before the Court (from another member state) to be addressed directly, which 
is unlikely once references to the Court from the UK cease. It would also be a heresy to the 
Brexiteers championing the return of ‘judicial sovereignty’. More obviously, the existing 
British legislation, in particular the Equality Act 2010, section 19, requires redrafting, with 
both aspects (Hampson and Bilka) of the justification defence included as mandatory steps in 
the process. The requirement of strict necessity should be included, and a procedural 
requirement that the ‘legitimate aims can only be those pleaded by the defendant. 
Short of such specific legislative amendments, the Bill should contain a rule of 
interpretation mandating a liberal and purposive approach, which happens to coincide with 
Luxembourg practice, but which is not unknown to the common law. 
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